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Abstract
When taxes on labor are introduced, a “tax wedge” appears between the labor costs 
paid by the employer (gross wage) and the net wage received by an employee. At a cer-
tain level of wage, a higher tax wedge increases unemployment and decreases employ-
ment, all other things being equal. The paper tackles three main questions: the charac-
teristics of the tax wedge, unemployment and employment rates in OECD countries in the 
recent past, tax wedge policy in the EU15 and the new EU members and the tax system 
and its effects on the unemployment and employment rates in Slovenia. We found that the 
OECD countries can be classified into two groups of countries if the tax wedge, the un-
employment rate and the employment rate are taken into consideration. The first group 
is the high tax wedge, high unemployment rate and low employment rate group of coun-
tries, whereas the other group has the opposite characteristics. European member states 
(old and new) have on average a higher tax burden on labor than the OECD average, 
consequently suffering from higher unemployment rates. Slovenia has an unreasonably 
high tax wedge; in the EU only Belgium and Germany have a higher tax burden. Accord-
ing to previous and our empirical findings we suggest that Slovenia could benefit from a 
reduction in the tax wedge.
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1 Introduction
When taxes on labor are introduced a “tax wedge” between the labor costs paid by 
the employer (gross wage) and the net wage received by an employee appears. Accord-
ing to OECD (2004) the tax wedge is the difference between what employers pay out in 
wages and social security charges and what employees take home after tax, also taking 
into account social security deductions and cash benefits.
At a certain level of wages, a higher tax wedge increases unemployment and decreas-
es employment, ceteris paribus. The actual effect of tax introduction depends on the elas-
ticity of demand and supply curves and the flexibility of the labor market. In a perfectly 
flexible labor market, the introduction of taxes would have only a “quantitative” effect 
on employment and there would again be no unemployed, because the quantity of active 
population would be set at equilibrium gross (and net) wage. But in reality labor markets 
are not perfectly flexible because of labor unions, the mandatory minimum wage, per-
fectly elastic supply of work curve under a certain level of wage, etc. Thus Vodopivec 
(2005) points out that by creating a wedge between the costs of labor and the real con-
sumption wage, labor taxes reduce the demand for labor and (if demand for labor is not 
perfectly inelastic) employment, increasing unemployment. 
OECD reports that tax wedges on labor have been falling in many OECD countries in 
recent years. This is helping to reduce a major obstacle to job creation and people’s willing-
ness to work (OECD, 2004). However, tax wedges are still significantly higher in most Eu-
ropean countries than in the USA, Canada, Australia or Asian countries. According to the 
IMF (2003) high unemployment rates in some European countries are attributable to labor-
market protection, such as generous unemployment benefits, powerful labor unions and em-
ployment protection legislation. On the other hand, Baker and Schmitt (2003) argue that the 
IMF analysis is not robust enough, claiming that the same result is not provided if the time 
period, the sample of countries or econometric specification is changed in reasonable way.
This paper tackles three main questions: (1) What are the characteristics of the tax 
wedge, unemployment and employment rate in OECD countries in the recent past? (2) 
What kind of tax wedge policy is significant for EU15 and new EU members? (3) What 
kind of tax system is implemented in Slovenia and what are the effects on the unemploy-
ment and employment rates?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The third part of the paper – after a de-
scription of data sources – discusses the characteristics of the tax wedge, unemployment 
and employment rates in OECD countries in the recent past, the fourth section analyses 
what kind of tax policy regarding the tax wedge is significant for EU15 and new EU mem-
bers. The fifth section discusses what kind of tax system is implemented in Slovenia and 
what the effects of such a system on the unemployment and employment rates are. We 
sum up with concluding remarks and some policy recommendations.
2 Data Sources
The analysis was based on three sources of data: (1) for OECD countries, the data 
on the tax wedge, the employment rate and the unemployment rate are OECD official 
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data (OECD, 2003), (2) for new European Union members the data on the tax wedge, 
the employment rate and the unemployment rate were obtained from data of Wien-
er Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (WIIW), (3) for Slovenia, the tax 
wedge was calculated on the basis of current tax regulations, whereas data on the em-
ployment  and unemployment rates were obtained from reports of Statistical Office 
of Slovenia.
All data are for the year 2002. The tax wedge data are internationally comparable, as 
they are all calculated for a single individual without children at the income level of the 
average production worker.
3  Characteristics of the Tax Wedge, and the Unemployment and Employment 
Rates in OECD Countries 
The OECD comprises 30 countries that differ economically (most of these are devel-
oped and minority of them are transition countries) as well as according to their defini-
tion of  the welfare state. Therefore is not surprising that the tax wedge in these countries 
varies; it ranges from 16% (in Mexico) through as high as 55% in Belgium. The OECD 
mean tax wedge is 35.8% (see Figure 1 and Table 1; data for Slovenia are inserted for 
comparison).
 Table 1 gives a detailed picture of the tax burden on labor and employment and un-
employment rates in different OECD countries (and Slovenia; for comparison)1. In most 
countries the tax wedge consists of income tax and social security contributions, paid usu-
ally by the employee and employer. Hungary and Poland also have a payroll tax of 0.3 
and 0.6%, respectively. It is interesting that countries have quite different structures of 
taxes on labor; coefficients of variation of different components are about 0.60, where-
as the (relative) variability of tax burden is much lower. This shows that countries have a 
different perspective of what the appropriate structure of tax wedge is; at the gross level, 
however, the differences are not so evident.
What are the characteristics of countries in the middle of the tax burden distribution 
and the two groups on the left and right tail? To answer this question we divided OECD 
countries into three equal groups (with high, mid and low tax wedges) and calculated the 
average tax wedge, average unemployment rate and average employment rate. For groups’ 
break points the 33rd and the 66th percentile were taken. 
Figure 2 shows that there are no significant differences between unemployment and 
employment rates in the OECD mid and OECD high groups. However, statistically sig-
nificant differences (at P = 0,00) may be found for the OECD low group (compared to 
the other two groups). Average unemployment and employment rates in the OECD mid 
and OECD high group of countries are about 8.2 and 63.9%, respectively. In the OECD 
low group of countries, however, average unemployment and employment rates are 4.4 
and 70.5%, respectively.
1 For the purpose of further analysis employment rates and unemployment rates are also shown.
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Table 1:  Taxes on labor, employment rates and unemployment rates in OECD countries 
(and Slovenia) in 2002 (in %)a
Country Taxes on laborb   
 Income   Social security  Payroll Total tax Employ.  Unemploy.
 tax contributions tax wedgec rate   rate
  employee employer  
Slovenia 12.4 18.2 13.2 4.4 48.2 65.8 5.9
Belgium 21 11 24 0 55 59.7 6.9
Germany 17 17 17 0 51 65.3 8.7
France 9 9 29 0 48 62.2 8.9
Sweden 18 5 25 0 48 74.9 5.2
Hungary 13 9 24 0.3 46.3 56.2 5.8
Italy 14 7 25 0 46 55.6 9.1
Austria 8 14 23 0 45 68.2 4.9
Finland 20 5 20 0 45 67.7 9.1
Poland 5 21 17 0.6 43.6 51.7 20.3
Czech Republic 8 9 26 0 43 65.7 7.3
Denmark 32 11 1 0 43 76.4 4.3
Slovak Republic 5 9 28 0 42 56.9 18.6
Turkey 12 12 18 0 42 46.7 10.6
Spain 10 5 23 0 38 59.5 11.4
Norway 19 7 11 0 37 77.1 4.0
Netherlands 6 19 10 0 36 74.5 2.6
Greece 0 12 22 0 35 56.9 9.8
Luxembourg 7 12 12 0 32 63.6 2.6
Portugal 4 9 19 0 32 68.1 5.4
Canada 18 6 7 0 31 71.5 7.7
Switzerland 9 10 10 0 30 78.9 3.0
United Kingdom 14 7 8 0 30 72.7 5.1
United States 15 7 7 0 30 71.9 5.9
Iceland 21 0 5 0 26 82.8 3.2
Australia 24 0 0 0 24 69.2 6.1
Ireland 10 4 10 0 24 65.0 4.3
Japan 6 9 10 0 24 68.2 5.6
New Zealand 20 0 0 0 20 72.4 5.3
Korea 2 6 8 0 16 63.3 3.2
Mexico 2 1 13 0 16 60.1 2.5
Averaged 12.3 8.4 15.1 0.0 36.0 66.1 6.9
Coefficient of variationd 0.6 0.6 0.6 4.0 0.3 0.1 0.6
 a OECD countries sorted in descending order according to total tax burden.
b Taxes on labor represent the structure of taxes in employer’s costs of an employee.
c  Tax wedge is the coefficient between all taxes and social security contribution payments, paid 
by employer and employee, and total cost of an employee for employer.
d Parameters calculated for OECD countries.
Source: OECD (2003); Statistical office of Slovenia; own calculations.
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Figure 1: The tax wedge in Slovenia and OECD countries in 2002 (in %)
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Source: OECD (2003); own calculations.
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This simple analysis confirms the hypothesis that a lower tax wedge corresponds to 
lower unemployment rate and higher employment rate. The results are comparable to Vo-
dopivec (2005), Nickell and Layard (1999), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Haltiwanger, 
Scarpetta, and Vodopivec (2003). It seems that for OECD countries the threshold of the 
tax wedge is about 30%. 
Not to be misled by descriptive statistics, cluster analysis has been applied to identi-
fy groups of OECD countries that are similar to each other with respect to the tax wedge, 
unemployment and employment rates. Taking all three variables2 into consideration the 
(statistical) distance among the countries shows which countries are near or apart. Note 
that variables were standardized to avoid different averages influencing the relative im-
portance of a variable.
Graphical representation of hierarchical clustering is presented by a dendrogram (Fig-
ure 3). The observations are listed on the vertical axis, and the horizontal axis represents 
the Euclidean distance between the centroids of the clusters (i.e. group averages). A large 
Euclidean distance between the centroids of the clusters is interpreted as a large difference 
between clusters; in this case observations are not supposed to be joint in one cluster.3 In 
our case it is obvious that there are two groups of OECD countries, which confirms (how-
ever statistically firmly) our previous speculation. The characteristics of these two groups 
of countries are shown in Table 2.
2 Variables were standardized to avoid different averages influencing the relative importance of a variable.
3 For detailed interpretation of cluster analysis and dendrogram see Sharma (1996:185-232).
Figure 2:  The tax wedge, unemployment rate and employment rate in three groups of 
OECD countries in 2002 (in %)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
tax wedge unemployment
rate
employment
rate
OECD low
OECD mid
OECD high
Source: Table 1; own calculations.
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Figure 3:  Dendrogram for OECD countries using the Ward Method and Hierarchical 
Clustering
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Source: Table 1; own calculations.
Table 2:  Characteristics of two groups of OECD countries clustered with respect 
to tax wedge, unemployment and employment rates 
Group  Tax wedge Unemployment rate Employment rate
1  (n = 18) 30.2 ± 9.2 4.5 ± 1.4 71.0 ± 5.9
2  (n = 12) 44.5 ± 5.4 10.5 ± 4.4 58.7 ± 6.1
Total (n = 30) 35.9 ± 10.5 6.9 ± 4.2 66.1 ± 8.5
Source: Table 1; own calculations.
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The first group is the low tax wedge, low unemployment rate and high employment 
rate group of OECD countries, whereas the second group is the alternative one (high 
tax wedge, high unemployment rate and low employment rate group of OECD coun-
tries). Our empirical evidence shows, that (at least in OECD countries) countries with a 
low tax wedge have low unemployment  and high employment rates, and the other way 
around. 
If the empirical results are to be applicable for other countries, e.g. Slovenia, we de-
veloped a rule to classify countries in these two groups. For this purpose two-group dis-
criminant analysis has been used. 
Equation 1: Estimated discriminant function
Zˆ    =3.668 + 0.101TW + 0.142UR - 0.125ER  
Cut-off value for Z is 0. Countries with positive Z are high tax wedge, high unemployment rate and 
low employment rate group of countries. The analysis has predicted group membership with 100% accu-
racy (for OECD countries). TW – tax wedge,UR – unemployment rate and ER – employment rate.
The likelihood of a country being classified as a high tax wedge, high unemployment 
rate and low employment rate country rises if the tax wedge increases (which, according 
to theoretical and empirical expectations, also causes an increase of unemployment and 
decrease of employment, pushing up the likelihood even more).
Here it should be stressed that the causality is obviously not clear-cut. If all coun-
tries had the same ratio between the sum of employed and unemployed with respect to 
the active population, only the number of employed and unemployed would be used 
to form groups. In this case the tax wedge would be considered an instrument, not an 
outcome!
4 Characteristics of the Tax Wedge in EU15 and New EU Members
The above analysis shows that EU15 countries (old EU members) are almost equal-
ly distributed in the first and the second group. The high tax wedge, high unemploy-
ment rate and low employment rate group of countries is composed of Greece, Spain, 
France, Germany, Finland, Italy and Belgium, whereas other countries belong to the al-
ternative group.
On average, European Union member states have a higher tax burden than the OECD 
average. The average tax wedge in the EU15 countries is 40.5% (4% pts higher than the 
OECD average) and for new EU members the figure is even a bit higher, 44.3% (see 
Figure 4). The difference between the tax burden in European Union member states and 
OECD countries is, we believe, the result of different factors, e.g. different definition of 
the welfare state, different demographic characteristics, etc.
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Figure 4: Tax wedge in EU15 countries and new EU members 2002 (in %)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
n.a.
n.a.
Source: Table 1; WIIW; own calculations.
Table 3:  Comparison of EU member states and non-EU OECD countries with respect 
to the tax wedge, and employment and unemployment rates
Group Tax wedge Unemployment rate Employment rate
EU member states 41.3 ± 7.8 7.6 ± 4.6 64.9 ± 7.4
Non-EU OECD countries 25.9 ± 7.9 5.3 ± 2.5 68.5 ± 10.1
T-test -5.15 1.48 1.11
P-value 0.00 0.05 0.14
Source: Table 1; own calculations.
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We mentioned above the difference between the average tax wedge in the EU15 coun-
tries and that in the new EU member states. The difference, however, is not statistically 
significant (P = 0.14). The insignificance is probably due to the high variability of the tax 
wedge in EU15 countries,4 whereas the (relative) variability of the tax wedge in new EU 
member states is much smaller.5 
But when comparing EU (old and new member states) with non-EU OECD coun-
tries we found that the tax wedge is higher in EU member states; the difference is more 
than 15 percentage points and significant at negligible significance. The difference in em-
ployment rates is not significant, probably due to the extremely high variance in non-EU 
OECD countries, but the difference in the unemployment rate is obvious – EU member 
states have significantly higher unemployment rates (see Table 3).
Here it is worthwhile to stress also that the unemployment rate is quite high (on av-
erage) in new EU member states, even though not entirely caused by high tax burden, but 
also (or mostly) by the other factors that are “squeezing” all transition economies.
5 The Tax Wedge in Slovenia
In Slovenia tax wedge is composed of personal income tax (paid by the employ-
ee) and social security contributions (paid both by employer and employee). Unusual-
ly, Slovenia has also introduced a payroll tax (paid by the employer). Among OECD and 
EU countries such a tax is used only in Hungary and Poland; it is, however significantly 
lower than in Slovenia (see Table 1). According to OECD methodology the tax wedge for 
a single individual without children at the income level of the average production work-
er was estimated at 48.2%6 in 2002 (see Equation 2 and Figure 5).  Because the tax sys-
tem has not changed much since the early 1990s, the time dimension of the tax wedge 
in Slovenia does not show any significant trends or characteristics. In fact, the estimated 
tax wedge for the same category of a worker in 2003 amounted to 48.1%. This is due to 
the fact that taxes and benefits are mainly connected to average wages rather than being 
fixed or linked to e.g. GDP. Any significant change of tax wedge would be caused only 
by a significant change of tax system.
Equation 2:  Calculation of the tax wedge in Slovenia in 2002 (according to OECD 
methodology; for a single individual without children at the income level of 
the average production worker) 
 tax wedge = 
PD + DSOUK + PPL
 = 48.2%
 
BRPL + DSOP + PPL
 
4 Coefficient of variation is 0.21.
5 Coefficient of variation is 0.04.
6 We calculated the figure on our own, because officially published data from different sources (note that OECD 
data for Slovenia is not available) are not necessarily comparable directly to OECD methodology.
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51,8
Source: Statistical Office of Slovenia; own calculations.
Slovenia has the highest tax wedge among new EU members (see Figure 5) and in 
the context of the EU25 countries the tax wedge is higher only in two countries (Ger-
many and Belgium). Using both methods, i.e. discriminant function, which has been es-
timated for OECD countries, and cluster analysis (recluster OECD countries with Slov-
enian data attached) we can classify Slovenia into the high tax wedge, high unemploy-
ment rate and low employment rate countries (Equation 3 and Figure 6). According to 
cluster analysis, Slovenia is most similar to Austria, France, Germany, Finland and the 
Czech Republic when   three parameters are compared simultaneously: tax wedge, em-
ployment rate and unemployment rate. All these countries have one of the highest tax 
wedges in the OECD as well as an above average unemployment rate. 
This fact was stressed also by European Commission in the latest Joint Employment 
Report (see European Commission 2005). It was explicitly pointed out that Slovenia still 
has an above average tax burden on labor, although some progress has been achieved 
through the recent tax reform package. 
Equation 3: Estimated discriminant score for Slovenia (estimate for 2002)
Zˆ    =3.668 + 0.101 x 48.2 + 0.142 x 5.9 - 0.125 x 65.8 = 1.15  (3)
Even though Slovenia has the highest tax wedge among new EU countries, its em-
ployment and unemployment rate is not critical, compared to data from other new EU 
countries. Slovenia has much lower unemployment rate and higher employment rate 
12,4
13,3
18,2
4,4
net wage
social security contribution 
paid by employee
social security contribution 
paid by employee
income tax
payroll tax
Figure 5:  The composition of the gross cost of work in Slovenia in 2002 (for a single 
individual without children at the income level of the average production worker 
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than Slovakia or Latvia, for example, even though its tax wedge is 5% pts higher. Com-
pared to Hungary Slovenia has a similar tax wedge (only 2% pts higher than Hungary) 
and unemployment rate, but a significantly higher employment rate. Compared to the 
other new EU members, Slovenia is a highly ranked economy despite its relatively high 
tax wedge. However, according to the European Commission (2005), the low employ-
ment rate (compared to EU15 countries), especially for persons over 55, is still a chal-
lenging problem in Slovenia.
Figure 6:  Dendrogram for Slovenia and OECD countries using the Ward Method and 
Hierarchical Clustering
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
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When compared to OECD countries, Slovenia’s estimated discriminant score is 1.15, 
whereas the mean in the group of countries with a high tax wedge, high unemployment 
rate and low employment rate is 2.31. This suggests that Slovenia is not far the cut-off 
point (i.e. not far from the low tax wedge, low unemployment rate and high employment 
rate group of countries). In fact, with respect to the employment and unemployment rates, 
Slovenia is somewhere in between, but the high tax wedge pushes it up.
These results suggest that Slovenia is at the boundary; it has a relatively low unem-
ployment rate and a relatively high employment rate with respect to the tax wedge. How-
ever, it would probably be difficult to lower the unemployment rate and raise the employ-
ment rate without a significant change in the tax wedge. This could reduce a major ob-
stacle to job creation and increase people’s willingness to work, resulting in expectedly 
higher employment and lower unemployment rates.
6 Concluding Remarks
OECD and IMF studies have shown that higher taxes on labor, including unemploy-
ment benefit contributions, significantly increase unemployment (see OECD, 2004 and 
IMF, 2003). This was confirmed in this study; our empirical evidence shows, that (at least 
in the OECD) countries with a lower tax wedge have a lower unemployment rate and a 
higher employment rate, and vice versa.
European countries have a high tax wedge, as compared to the OECD average. The 
average tax wedge in EU15 countries is 40.5% (4% pts higher than OECD average) and 
for new EU members the figure is even a bit higher, at 44.3%. Differences between EU15 
countries and new EU members were not found to be statistically significant.
In Slovenia the tax wedge is composed of personal income tax (paid by the employ-
ee), social security contributions (paid both by employer and employee) and payroll tax 
(paid by the employer). The later is also used only in Hungary and Poland, but here the 
tax rate is 5-10 times lower than in Slovenia. Compared to OECD countries, EU15 coun-
tries and the new EU members Slovenia has a very high tax wage on labor (for single in-
dividual without children at the income level of the average production worker the tax 
wedge was estimated at 48.2% in 2002). In our opinion this hinders any more effective 
battle with unemployment.
According to Vodopivec (2005), Nickell and Layard (1999), Daveri and Tabel-
lini (2000), Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Vodopivec (2003) a tax reduction could in-
crease demand for labor and employment and result in lower unemployment. Nickell 
and Layard (1999), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Vodop-
ivec (2003) argue that higher taxes on labor, including unemployment benefit con-
tributions, significantly increase unemployment. Nickell and Layard (1999), for ex-
ample, report that a 5 percentage point decrease in the aggregate tax wage (which in-
cludes payroll, income, and consumption taxes) would reduce the unemployment rate 
by 13 percent (for example, from 8 percent to 7 percent). They also argue that differ-
ent types of taxes have the same effect on unemployment. If we apply Nickell and La-
yard’s analysis to Slovenia, a 5% pts decrease in the aggregate tax wage (that is from 
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approximately 48 to 43) could reduce the unemployment rate by about 13 percent (that 
is from 5.9 to 5.1 in 2002). 
Thorough analysis of the influence of tax wedge on employment and unemployment 
rates in Slovenia should maybe base on time series data for Slovenia. However,  because 
the tax system has not changed much in the last 15 years and since there is no relevant 
information for the period before the 1990s (because of the incomparable economic sys-
tems), our analysis could be based only on cross section data. This analysis shows that 
only the abolition of Slovenian peculiarity (the payroll tax) would lower the tax wedge 
by 2.4% pts. But the budget revenue from this tax amounted to 93 billion tolars in 2002, 
which is approximately 8% of the yearly budget. This figure shows clearly why the gov-
ernment hesitates to abolish the payroll tax although employers and labor unions are con-
stantly warning, that this tax (in combination with other taxes on labor) causes unreason-
able pressure on the labor market. Nevertheless, loss in budget incomes due to the abo-
lition of the payroll tax would be compensated  for by savings on unemployment insur-
ance and unemployment assistance payments due to (the expected) lower unemployment 
and additional budgetary income from the newly employed, probably also moving from 
undeclared work. 
One could argue that due to strong labor unions the reduction of tax wedge would be 
passed on to net wages without any effect on employment. This could be the case if there 
were no    strong social partnership (which is represented in Economic and Social Coun-
cil), therefore it is really unlikely that only the labor unions (or the already employed) 
would gain the positive effect; due to cooperation among the social partners it is very like-
ly that the effect would be also or primarily on employment. Besides that the social dialog 
in Slovenia usually prefers employment prior to the level of wages.
Keeping the above figures in mind, Slovenia could reach the low tax wedge, low 
unemployment rate and high employment rate group of OECD countries with a reduc-
tion of the tax on labor of approximately 9% pts. This would, ceteris paribus, reduce the 
unemployment rate to the mean of the low tax wedge, low unemployment rate and high 
employment rate group of OECD countries (4.5%). However, this tax reduction would 
not be sufficient to increase the employment rate to the group’s average. For this to hap-
pen, not only should the unemployed be reactivated, but also others, who are capable of 
working but not willing to, should be encouraged to join (official) employment.
To sum up, Slovenia should follow the trend that has characterised OECD countries 
in recent years, where tax wedges on labor have been falling, helping to reduce a major 
obstacle to job creation and people’s willingness to work (OECD, 2004). However, a tax 
reduction along probably would not be sufficient. In Slovenia (as in many European coun-
tries, as reported by (IMF, 2003)) the high unemployment rate is attributable to labor-mar-
ket protection, such as generous unemployment benefits, powerful unions and, especially, 
employment protection legislation. 
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